With talk that US President Donald Trump is set to launch the Gaza “Board of Peace” imminently, and names on the Gaza technocratic committee becoming public, this is an important moment to consider what Americans, Palestinians and key players in the region can do to improve both the catastrophic situation on the ground and the medium-term prospects for progress toward freedom, security and prosperity for all.

The devastation in Gaza and the killing of tens of thousands of Palestinians, combined with the erosion of Palestinian political legitimacy, have reinforced a belief on all sides that US-Palestinian diplomacy has little constructive role left to play. Beyond the immense human toll, Gaza’s destruction has hollowed out Palestinian institutions, deepened fragmentation and reduced international engagement to crisis management.

Yet a paradox is emerging. Trump’s unconventional, transactional approach to the Middle East, often dismissed as chaotic or indifferent to long-term outcomes, has created a narrow but real opening for renewed US-Palestinian engagement around a pragmatic agenda. Whether this opening leads to progress or closes quickly will depend less on lofty principles and more on political agility, credible proposals, regional alignment and overdue Palestinian political renewal, all under the hard constraint of Israeli politics.

Trump’s foreign policy is neither ideological nor institutional. It is centralized, personality-driven and oriented toward visible, near-term wins. Traditional diplomatic reference points like the Oslo Accords, UN resolutions or even two-state parameters carry little weight unless they serve immediate political or strategic utility. Decision-making is concentrated among a small circle and shaped by domestic incentives and legacy considerations rather than process. This generates unpredictability but it also creates openings. Actors able to move quickly, speak Trump’s language and offer concrete, outcome-oriented proposals can shape policy in ways that would be difficult under more procedural administrations.

The Trump administration’s core concerns are not Palestinian statehood or final-status negotiations but regional stability and commercial advantage. Yet, embedded in Trump-era frameworks, including the widely discussed “20-point plan,” is a recognition often overlooked by critics: no sustainable postwar arrangement in Gaza is possible without a credible Palestinian partner and meaningful regional buy-in.

A potential game-changer is the creation of the US-led Civil-Military Coordination Center, which marks the first sustained international role in on-the-ground governance and security in Palestine in the modern era — with the Trump administration stating it would be “calling the shots.” It reflects a pragmatic realization that security, governance and reconstruction cannot be separated and that Palestinian lives cannot be indefinitely bypassed without undermining stability itself.

Trump’s relationship with Israel is also more contingent than is often assumed. US support is shaped by domestic political calculations and Trump’s personal distrust of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. When Trump feels manipulated or sees advantage elsewhere, he has shown a willingness to pressure the Israeli leadership. Similarly with Palestinian factions. Regional actors engage him pragmatically rather than rhetorically.

Still, Israeli politics remains a difficult variable. Few observers believe the current Israeli government supports the political components of US frameworks, including any credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination, which in turn fuels Palestinian skepticism. Even under a transactional US president willing to apply pressure, expectations for Israeli flexibility remain low. This constraint must be confronted honestly.

No sustainable postwar arrangement in Gaza is possible without a credible Palestinian partner and meaningful regional buy-in.

Hady Amr
At the same time, the US political landscape is shifting. Within Republican circles, traditional pro-Israel positions increasingly coexist with “America First” skepticism toward foreign entanglements and open-ended commitments. Within the Democratic Party, the center of gravity is moving toward a values-based framework that treats Palestinian freedom and self-determination as integral to US credibility abroad. Polling showing roughly half of Democrats sympathizing more with Palestinians than Israelis — unthinkable a decade ago — suggests US policy may eventually move, one way or another.

For the Palestinian leadership, opportunity comes with risk. There is a deep trust deficit toward both Democratic and Republican administrations in Washington, shaped by decades in which US policy enabled Palestinian suffering while reframing a national struggle for freedom as a humanitarian management problem. Yet the US remains the indispensable arena for tangible gains, given its influence over Israel and its ability to mobilize regional actors. The dilemma is how to engage pragmatically with a transactional Trump administration without reinforcing perceptions of collaboration or further eroding domestic legitimacy.

Indeed, the Palestinian legitimacy crisis is structural. Since the Oslo Accords were signed in the 1990s, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization have been trapped between acting as a national liberation movement and functioning as a security partner to Israel under Israeli occupation. Governance reform is necessary but insufficient; no amount of reform alone will convince Israel or the US to endorse Palestinian statehood.

Re-legitimation requires political renewal. National elections are essential but must take place under a structure that Palestinians view as legitimate — which we do not have right now. Most Palestinians, especially the majority aged under 35, have never voted in national elections and remain disconnected from existing political structures. Palestinian municipal elections scheduled for this spring are important, but they cannot substitute for broader renewal.

Yet without a tangible political horizon, Palestinian leaders cannot maintain public buy-in. In this context, harm reduction becomes a necessary — if deeply unsatisfying — objective. Even limited Israeli restraint, such as easing movement restrictions or releasing withheld revenues, could materially improve conditions and preserve the possibility of future progress. A different Israeli government in or after 2026 may not endorse statehood, but it could be less actively obstructive.

Regionally, Palestinian-Gulf relations require repair. Gulf states are indispensable but not unified. Saudi Arabia carries unique political weight, while Qatar and the UAE can play constructive roles. Engagement must move beyond episodic financial assistance toward structured political partnership anchored in regular dialogue and shared planning.

The path forward is fragile and uncertain. If Palestinian leaders choose to seize this opening, they should engage Washington pragmatically, with proposal-driven diplomacy adapted to Trump’s preference for speed and visible outcomes. This means: advancing credible security frameworks; staged approaches to weapons control linked to civilian gains; and pilot governance arrangements that reconnect interim Gaza mechanisms to national institutions. On the US side, the real power would come in leveraging the Civil-Military Coordination Center to protect lives and promote freedom and prosperity not only in Gaza but in the West Bank as well, where settler violence has reached unprecedented levels.

None of this guarantees success. But inaction carries costs: further erosion of Palestinian national capacity and, for the US, growing strain from being tied to an increasingly isolated ultranationalist Israeli government and the new reality the indefinite denial of Palestinian self-determination no longer comes without significant strategic consequences for Washington. If the US and the Palestinian leadership can work together to a legitimate, effective and unified Palestinian political body, that body can, in turn, help build regional stability. That would be a win-win, not only for Americans and Palestinians but the entire Middle East.

Hady Amr previously served as US Special Representative for Palestinian Affairs and as Deputy Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations for Economics and Gaza. X: @HadyAmr